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RACIAL REDISTRICTING IN A
POST-RACIAL WORLD
Gilda R. Daniels'
ABSTRACT

The 2011 redistricting will provide some interesting challenges for
minority voting rights. How can we preserve minority electoral
opportunities and gains in the wake of Bartlett v. Strickland and
Georgia v. Ashcroft? What is the impact on future voting rights
litigation and are coalition district claims viable as an opportunity to
continue the electoral gains made since the passage of the Voting Rights
Act? Are majority-minority districts safe from legislative backsliding?
The Supreme Court's construed admonitions against race-conscious
redistricting in recent cases may become cautionary tales. This Article
discusses the central role the Voting Rights Act should play in
preserving minority electoral gains.
While most of us would prefer to live in a color-blind society, we
live in a "second-best" world where color-conscious problems
require color-conscious remedies.
-Bernard Grofman 1
INTRODUCTION

As we approach the 2011 redistricting cycle, the ability to maintain
minority electoral gains that have been made since the passage of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA) takes center stage. Recent Supreme Court
decisions in Bartlett v. StricklancP and Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder 3 could serve as
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank
the faculty at the University of Baltimore School of Law, the coordinators of the Third National
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference for selecting our panel, and my exceptional
research assistant Anne Wilkinson.
I BERNARD GROFMAN, RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at 78 (1998) (citation
omitted).
2 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (holding that the Voting Rights Act did not require states to draw
crossover districts); see infra Part II.B.
3 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA).
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cautionary tales for the upcoming 2011 redistricting cycle. 4
Additionally, Congress's legislative fix to Georgia v. Ashcroft5 in the
2006 VRA reauthorization 6 and the current administration's
interpretation of how to apply the new redistricting standards under
section 57 are crucial to the status of minority electoral rights. How
legislatures and the federal government interpret their responsibilities
under the VRA can determine the difference between preserving gains
made since the passage of the Act and backsliding. 8
These
developments bring the strength and necessity of the VRA to center
stage. As the actors gather to argue their positions and secure their
constituencies, the parameters of the VRA can assist in maintaining
adherence to constitutional and statutory principles enacted to protect
minority voting rights and equal access to the democratic process.
Scholars have suggested, based on considerable minority electoral
success, that the VRA, and particularly section 5 of the Act, has fulfilled
its purpose and is no longer needed. 9 Some commentators suggest,
referencing President Obama's election, that we have reached a place in
our society where race has lessened in significance,· declaring the

4 E.g., Roger Clegg, Voting Rights and Equal Protection, The Future of the Voting Rights
Act ajier Bartlett and NAMUDNO, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35 (focusing on NAMUDNO and
Bartlett and discussing the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment); Joshua Douglas, The Voting
Rights Act Through the Justice's Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSO I
(2009) (discussing NAMUDNO and Bartlett in the context of the emerging trends of election law
jurisprudence).
5 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
6 In 2006, Congress extended the VRA's temporary provisions for an additional twenty-five
years and provided a legislative fix to the Supreme Court's Georgia v. Ashcroji decision. See
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2006»; see also Jocelyn Benson, Note, Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Making
Georgia v. Ashcroft the Mobile v. Bolden of 2007, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485, 486 (2004)
(advocating for a legislative fix to the Court's narrow interpretations of section 5).
742 U.S.c. § 1973cinpertinentpartreads:
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color,
or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, to
elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the
meaning of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The term "purpose" in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall include any
discriminatory purpose.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to protect the ability of such citizens
to elect their preferred candidates of choice.
8 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477 (2003) ("[P]reclearance under § 5 affirms
nothing but the absence of backsliding." (emphasis added».
9 See, e.g., Abigail Themstrom, Focus on the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 41, 41 (2007) (praising the VRA
as it was enacted; however, noting that the Department of Justice and courts have "rewritten the
statute" and that the Act's "constitutional legitimacy has been seriously undermined," especially
in the section 5 context).
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country officially post-racial, where race bears little significance or
consequence. 10 In this self-proclaimed post-racial era, there are those
who would argue for the elimination of the VRA and the elimination of
racial considerations in the districting process. II
While President Obama's election was certainly historical, that
event alone does not serve as an indication that we have reached the
post-racial promised land. 12 Moreover, the post-racial proclamation is
perplexing. Should Hillary Clinton 13 or Sarah Palin 14 win election to
America's highest office, would we then declare that the country has
reached a post-gender state where sex has less significance? Feminists
and others around the world would certainly celebrate the
accomplishment, but surely they would consider it for what it
represents: progress. Consequently, President Barack Obama's election
serves as a mere symbol of America's progression, but our country must
make much more political and social advancement before we can truly
become post-racial. Likewise, considerably more progress must be
made in the electoral realm in state houses, governorships, and the
United States Congress, particularly in the Senate, before we can
declare a race-neutral state of affairs. 15 When considering former and
current gains, one must juxtapose the progress against the current
climate of post-racialism, which suggests that enough progress has been
made in the minority electoral arena.
For example, with the Supreme Court's construed admonitions
against race-conscious redistricting, and its endorsement of influence
districts as a post-racial panacea, how can we preserve minority
10 See, e.g., Shelby Steele, Obama's Post-Racial Promise: Barack Obama Seduced Whites
with a Vision of Their Racial Innocence Precisely to Coerce Them into Acting out of a Racial
Motivation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A31, available at http://articles.latimes.coml2008/

novI05/opinionJoe-steele5 (discussing the phenomenon known as "post-racial" America).
II See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 4 (arguing that it makes sense to limit section 2). Clegg
believes that both section 2 and section 5 have been so successful that it makes sense at this point
"to scrap the law altogether and start anew," basing this belief on concerns regarding federalism
and federal overreaching. Id. at 50.
12 See Thomas 1. Sugrue, The Myth of Post-Racial America, POL. BOOKWORM (June 10,
20 I 0, 5 :30 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.comlpolitical-bookworrnl20 1O/06/the_myth_of
yost-racial_americ.html (arguing that we have not yet attained a post-racial America).
13 Kate Snow, Hillary Clinton Launching Presidential Run, ABC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2810072&page= I (discussing the announcement of
Hillary Clinton as a presidential candidate for the 2008 election).
14 McCain Taps Alaska Gov. Palin as Vice President Pick, CNN.COM (Aug. 29,
2008),
http://artic1es.cnn.coml2008-08-29/politics/palin.republican. vp.candidate_1_safetycommissioner-walt-monegan-sarah-palin-alaska-gov?_ s=PM :POLITICS
(discussing
the
announcement of Sarah Palin as the Vice Presidential candidate for the 2008 election).
15 Currently, there are no African American United States Senators, one African American
governor, and a small number of African Americans who were elected to statewide office in the
20 I 0 midterm elections. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES,
BLACKS AND THE 2010 MIDTERMS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 6-7 (2010), available
http://www.jointcenter.orglpublicationsJecentyublications/politicalyarticipationlblacks_
at
and_the_ 20 I 0_midterms_ ayreliminary_analysis.
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electoral opportunities and gains in the wake of Bartlett v. Strickland?16
What is the impact on future section 2 litigation, and are influence,
crossover and coalition districts viable as opportunities to continue the
electoral gains made since the passage of the VRA? With the 2011
redistricting cycle quickly approaching, how these questions are
interpreted could mean the difference between maintaining minority
electoral gains and returning to the barrier-laden election structures of
the past.
This Article will propose approaches to redistricting that prevent
jurisdictions from backsliding and ways to preserve minority gains
without running afoul of constitutional considerations. 17 This Article
advocates that reliance on and enforcement of the VRA provide the best
protection for the continued maintenance of minority electoral gains.
Part I of this Article will discuss the importance of the VRA and how it
remains a centerpiece in the quest for equal opportunity in the electoral
process. Part II explores redistricting jurisprudence as it relates to the
use of race. Part III analyzes the issue of post-racial redistricting and
suggests approaches using recent cases, such as Bartlett, to secure and
preserve gains that have been made since the VRA.

I.

IMPORTANCE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Prior to the passage of the VRA, minority voters could rely only
upon the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to attempt to correct and
restore their right to vote. 18 The minority voters' ability to elect
representatives had historically been undermined through the use of the
redistricting process to dilute votes from minority communities.
Jurisdictions practiced "cracking," where they would split large
concentrations of minority voters into smaller powerless groups, and
"packing," where they would "pack" as many minority voters as possible
into districts to limit the number of positions that minorities could
control. 19 For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Alabama
legislature changed the boundaries of predominately black Tuskegee,
Alabama, "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."20

129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
17 This Article includes ideas that I will explore and expand in Proxy Politics: Exploring the
Intersection ofRace and Partisanship in Redistricting, forthcoming 20 II.
18 See GROFMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
and previous Civil Rights Acts from 1957 and 1964 were not helpful in advancing electoral
opportunities).
19 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); see also Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting
Rights
Act of 1965,
U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlvoting/intro/
intro_b.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
20 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
16
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Petitioners argued that the legislature had done so in an effort to deny
them the right to vote. The Court, after distinguishing this case from
one involving a political question, agreed. 21 The piecemeal ability to
address these kinds of shenanigans involving the drawing of election
districts, voter registration, and voter intimidation, and Attorney
General Katzenbach' s cries for help, led Congress to pass the VRA.22
The VRA has been heralded as one of the most effective pieces of
legislation in this country's history. 23 The Act was intended to
demolish barriers to voter participation and created an environment in
which minority citizens envisioned an equal opportunity to participate
in the electoral process. 24 The VRA contains two primary enforcement
provisions: Section 2 25 prohibits discrimination in voting based on race,

21 The Court addressed the State's argument that the drawing of the district lines was a
political question that was left to the legislature to answer. The Court found this case
distinguishable, holding:
The decisive facts in this case, which at this stage must be taken as proved, are wholly
different from the considerations found controlling in Colegrove. That case involved a
complaint of discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts. The appellants
in Colegrove complained only of a dilution of the strength of their votes as a result of
legislative inaction over a course of many years. The petitioners here complain that
affirmative legislative action deprives them of their votes and the consequent
advantages that the ballot affords. When a legislature thus singles out a readily
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates
the Fifteenth Amendment.
Id. at 346.
22 In an effort to advocate for the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Attorney General
Katzenbach asked Congress and President Lyndon B. Johnson to pass legislation that would give
the Department of Justice more authority to combat racial discrimination involved in the voting
process and voter intimidation of black voters. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 30 I
(1966), the Court noted:
In recent years, Congress has repeatedly tried to cope with the problem by facilitating
case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1957
authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctions against public and private
interference with the right to vote on racial grounds. The Civil Rights Act of 1960
permitted the joinder of States as defendants, gave the Attorney General access to local
voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in areas of systematic
discrimination. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expedited the hearing of voting
cases before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used to disqualify
Negroes from voting in federal elections. Despite the earnest efforts of the Justice
Department and of many federal judges, these new laws have done little to cure the
problem of voting discrimination.
Id. at 313.
23 See H.R. REp. NO. 97-227, at 3 (1981).
24 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the passage
of the VRA was "to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting" (citing Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 335)).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Section 2 reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
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color or language minority status; and section 5 26 requires specified
jurisdictions to submit all of their voting administration changes to the
Attorney General or United States District Court for the District of
Columbia prior to implementation.
The VRA addressed systemic discrimination regarding the
unwillingness of Southern whites in particular to register African
American voters and electoral schemes such as at-large methods of
electing governing bodies. In both instances, the VRA provided a
means, such as federal registrars and observers, to address voter
registration issues, while sections 2 and 5 addressed discriminatory
electoral schemes.2 7 Both are important in the pursuit of equal electoral
opportunity. On the issue of redistricting, both play an important role.
A.

Section 2 and Redistricting

Congress included a nationwide prohibition against discrimination
in enacting section 2 of the Act. 28 This provision imposes a prohibition
against racial discrimination in any voting standard, practice or
procedure, including redistricting plans. Under section 2, "[p ]laintiffs
must demonstrate that ... the devices result in unequal access to the
electoral process."29 This section of the VRA allows for both vote

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
27 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009) (avoiding the challenge to the constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA by finding that the
utility district was a "political subdivision" under section 5 of the Act and extending the "bailout
provisions" to encompass such entities and allow them the opportunity to withdraw or "bail out"
of the requirements of section 5); League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399 (2006) (finding that aspects of Texas's mid-decade redistricting violated section 2 of the
VRA).
28 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152 (1993) ("Congress enacted § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that no citizen's right
to vote shall 'be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.'" (citations omitted».
29 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (citations omitted).
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dilution and vote denial cases. 30 Vote dilution occurs when a person is
allowed to cast a ballot, but that ballot is not counted as equally as other
votes. Such a voting practice or procedure dilutes the effectiveness of
that vote and generally refers to the group's right or ability to participate
in the democratic process. 31 Vote denial occurs when an individual is
not allowed to cast a ballot due to some voting practice, procedure or
voting mechanism, such as election administration measures or felon
disenfranchisement. 32 Race-conscious districts have provided a remedy
for vote dilution situations in jurisdictions throughout the country.
Indeed, the VRA is a race-conscious statute that prohibits discrimination
based on, inter alia, race. 33 In 1982, Congress amended section 2 of the
VRA to underscore that this portion of the Act prohibited voting laws or
practices that denied minority voters an equal opportunity "to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."34
Section 2 of the VRA provides voters with the ability to challenge
racially discriminatory districting practices that dilute the minority
group's ability to participate equally in the electoral process. 35
Thornburg v. Gingles 36 established the framework for vote dilution
claims. To challenge a method of election that allows for large voting
districts, i.e., at-large or multi-member systems, plaintiffs must satisfy
all three preconditions set out in Gingles: geographic compactness,
political cohesion, and legally significant white bloc voting. 37 If

30 Professor Daniel P. Tokaji makes a similar distinction in The New Vote Denial: Where
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689, 691-95 (2006) (describing
voter ID cases as "the new vote denial" and exploring the application of section 2 to these cases).
31 Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed is a Vote Denied: A Proactive Approach to Eliminating
Election Administration Legislation that Disel1franchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REv. 57,66 (2008); see also Tokaji, supra note 30, at 691.
32 See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Washington's
felon disenfranchisement laws did not violate the VRA); see also Miss. State Chapter, Operation
Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1264 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (involving failure to make local clerks
deputy registrars or to implement satellite registration accessible to black voters), ajJ'd sub nom.
Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1991); Goodloe v.
Madison Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 610 F. Supp. 240, 241-42 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (involving
selective invalidation of one notary's absentee ballots-all from black voters-without individualized
review, with resulting racial disparity in invalidations).
33 See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 152 ("Congress enacted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.c. § 1973, to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that no citizen's right
to vote shall 'be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.'" (citations omitted».
34 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
35 See id.
36 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
37 The Gingles preconditions are as follows:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district ... .
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive ... .
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the
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plaintiffs succeed in satisfying these preconditions, courts are required
to consider the totality of the circumstances and to determine,
considering both past and contemporary examples of discrimination,
whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. 38
Plaintiffs may provide other examples of inequality in the electoral
system or instances of historical discrimination and disparities in
proving the totality of circumstances.
Vote dilution cases under section 2 of the VRA have been
extremely helpful in ensuring that all Americans have equal access to
the electoral process. 39 The use of section 2 to combat racially
discriminatory redistricting schemes has evolved beyond the blackwhite binary and encompassed other minority groups in their pursuit of
equal opportunity. 40 States must have a compelling reason before they
minority candidate running unopposed ...-usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.
Id at 50-51.
38 In Gingles, the Supreme Court adopted several factors that the Senate Judiciary Committee
suggested should be considered in determining the totality of circumstances analysis:
[T]he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the
extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially
polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting
practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the
minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group
members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and
the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction.
Id at 44-45.
39 In the 1980s and 1990s, voting rights attorneys waged a vigorous assault on practices and
procedures, such as at-large districts, that tended to exclude African Americans from the political
structure. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,878-80 (1994) (challenging under section 2 size
of governing bodies); Growe v: Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (challenging under section 2 singlemember districts); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,384-85 (1991) (challenging under section 2
state multi-member judicial districts); United States v. Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir.
2004) (alleging that county's at-large election of its council diluted minority voting strength in
violation of section 2); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000)
(involving African-American voters bringing class action under VRA challenging city's at-large
system for electing city council members and park district board; after finding that at-large
system violated Act, court ordered establishment of at-large system that used cumulative voting
and awarded attorney fees to voters); Goosby V. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir.
1999) (challenging successfully at-large voting practice used to select members of Town Board).
40 Hispanics and Native Americans have also found success with challenging redistricting
schemes under section 2. Accordingly, one trend has been the move west in bringing section 2
results claims pursuant to Gingles. See, e.g., Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir.
2006) (challenging the State of South Dakota legislative redistricting plan as violative of section 5
and section 2 of the VRA; the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's opinion that the
plaintiffs had made the appropriate showing under Gingles that Native-Americans were
politically cohesive and that white majority voting bloc usually defeated Indian-preferred
candidate, and the totality of circumstances indicated violation of section 2); United States v.
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may intentionally draw a district using race as a predominant factor. 41
The Supreme Court has found adherence to the VRA compelling. 42
B.

Section 5 and Redistricting

Section 5 of the VRA also addresses discrimination, but does so in
a more preemptive manner. 43 After hearing a plethora of testimony
regarding the discriminatory practices implemented throughout the
South, Congress included section 5 in the VRA and required specific
jurisdictions, commonly referred to as "covered jurisdictions,"44 to
submit all voting changes to either the Attorney General of the United
States or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Once
received, the Attorney General or the court reviews the submission to
determine whether the change has the purpose or effect of denying the
right to vote based on race, color or language minority status. 45 The
covered jurisdiction's submission is also reviewed for retrogression, i.e.,
whether the new plan places minority voters in a worse position than
before the redistricting. 46 Whether the jurisdiction chooses to submit
the change to the Attorney General or the District Court for the District
of Columbia, it must demonstrate that the submitted change "neither has
the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color, or [language minority groUp]."47
Section 5's preclearance requirement is preemptive because it mandates
that a covered jurisdiction demonstrate prior to the enactment of
legislation that its proposed change is free from a discriminatory
Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004).(holding that the at-large voting system for electing
members to county commission as violative of Native American residents' rights under VRA)j
Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1998) (challenging city's at-large city council
election system under VRA)
41 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-59, 962-64 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
916 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
42 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 (2006)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Vera, 517 U.S. at 994.
43 See Daniels, supra note 31, at 68-70 (discussing section 5's preemptive powers).
44 42 U.S.c. § 1973b(b) (2000) (defining "covered jurisdictions" as those jurisdictions that on
November I, 1964 utilized a "test or device" that restricted the right to vote and where less than
fifty percent of the voting age population were registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or less
than fifty percent of registered voters actually voted in the 1964 presidential election); Lopez v.
Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999) ("Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act under its
authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's proscription against voting discrimination. The
Act contains generally applicable voting rights protections, but it also places special restrictions
on voting activity within designated, or 'covered,' jurisdictions."); see also Section 5 Covered
Jurisdictions, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crtlvoting/sec_5/covered.php (last visited
Dec. 23,2010) (providing map of all section 5 covered jurisdictions).
45 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2000).
46 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
47 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
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purpose or effect. 48 If a jurisdiction decides to submit the change to the
Attorney General, he has sixty days to review the change and either
preclear or object. If the Attorney General does not take any action
within the sixty-day period, the change is deemed precleared. Further,
if the Attorney General takes an action, his subsequent preclearance or
objection is not subject to judicial scrutiny.49
The Supreme Court has found that legislators may draw majorityminority districts in an attempt to comply with sections 2 and 5 of the
VRA.50 As discussed above, however, the use of race in redistricting
has become extremely suspicious when it is used to improve the
electoral positions of racial minorities.

II.

RACE AND REDISTRICTING

Courts have analyzed the use of race-conscious redistricting and the
import of sections 2 and 5 in the redistricting process. 51 However, the
use of race-based constitutional challenges in the 1990s seemed to
threaten gains.
A.

That Was Then: Shaw and Its Progeny

In Shaw v. Reno,52 plaintiffs charged that the "State had created an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander" in violation of the Fourteenth

48 Pursuant to section 5, "covered jurisdictions" must receive preclearance of voting changes
through the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia prior to implementation. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439.
49 See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1977) (holding section 5 decisions final and
not subject to judicial review).
50 In Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor stated:
[S]o long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for
its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority districts,
and may otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny.
Only if traditional districting criteria are neglected and that neglect is predominately
due to the misuse of race does strict scrutiny apply.
517 U.S. 952, 993 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see
also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny of majority-minority
districts is appropriate when "race was the predominant factor in the jurisdiction'S redistricting
decision").
51 See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier /1), 528 U.S. 320, 328 (2000); Miller, 515
U.S. at 919-20 (finding that race predominated in the drawing of the congressional districts);
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 882 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993) (implicitly
finding that challenging majority-minority districts was a justiciable issue and subject to strict
scrutiny); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,45-46 (1986).
52 509 U.S. 630.
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They argued that the two districts were crafted
Amendment. 53
"arbitrarily-without regard to considerations such as compactness,
contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions, with
the purpose to create congressional districts along racial lines and to
assure the election of two black representatives to Congress."54 With
regard to the equal protection claim, the Court stated that certain
redistricting schemes that are "adopted with a discriminatory purpose
and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength" will violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 55 However, the Court made very clear that this
was not a vote dilution case because appellants never alleged that the
plan "unconstitutionally diluted white voting strength."56 Although a
facial challenge, the Court concluded that because the newly-drawn
districts were "so bizarre," they were "unexplainable on grounds other
than race"; thus, strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of
review. 57
An important element of Shaw is that the jurisdiction forwarded
that its purpose in drawing the districts was to avoid retrogression. 58 In
voting rights nomenclature, jurisdictions retrogress when they adopt
plans that put minority groups in a worse position. 59 In this instance,
the Court rejected that argument and found that the plan was not
narrowly tailored and admonished jurisdictions to only do what is
"reasonably necessary" to avoid retrogression. 6o
Many advocates were dismayed with the Supreme Court's decision
and saw Shaw and subsequent decisions as the beginning of the end for
majority-minority districts. 61 Yet, it was not to be so. The emphasis on
53 Id. at 636.
54 Id. at 637 (internal quotations omitted).
55 Id. at 641.
56 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
57 Id. at 644 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
58 The State suggested its legislative purpose was a "compelling interest," that being the
creation of "majority-minority districts" to comply with VRA's section 5 "nonretrogression
principle." Id. at 653-54.
59 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (finding that section 5 prohibited
voting changes that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise"); see also Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and
Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 1575 (2010) (arguing for an expansion of the
discriminatory purpose standard beyond retrogression in certain circumstances).
60 The Court acknowledged it never "held that race-conscious state decision-making is
impermissible in all circumstances." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. Consequently, merely because a
jurisdiction's plan is nonretrogressive does not give them "carte blanche to engage in racial
gerrymandering in the name ofnonretrogression." Id. at 655.
61 Most troubling were situations where black voters were in a position to gain a district or
where the legislature was in a position where it could create a majority-minority district but did
not. Under the facts in Bossier 1/, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), the current board did not have any
African Americans, yet Bossier Parish had a considerable minority population. Id. at 341
(Thomas, J., concurring). The School Board, nonetheless, submitted a plan under section 5 of the
VRA to the Attorney General for preclearance and the NAACP submitted an illustrative plan that
included at least one majority-minority district. Id. at 324. The Department of Justice objected
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shape tended to cast dispersions on oddly shaped districts with black
majorities, while no such scrutiny was placed on majority white districts
with bizarre or odd shapes. 62 The Court, however, in its discussions,
made it clear that race could serve as a consideration, but legislators had
to balance those considerations with other traditional redistricting
principles, such as incumbency and party affiliation. 63
In Lawyer v. Department ofJustice, 64 the Court seemed to reassure
advocates that racial considerations were allowable in the redistricting
process. In Lawyer, the Supreme Court examined whether Florida
unconstitutionally considered race in drafting its redistricting plan. 65
The Court found it did not. Appellants argued that race predominated
because the district at issue encompassed more than one county, crossed
a body of water, was oddly shaped, and had a much higher percentage
of black voters than other counties. 66 The Court, however, found that
none of these factors were "different from what Florida's traditional
districting principles could be expected to produce" and that race did
not predominate. 67
B.

This Is Now: Georgia and Bartlett

In this new millennium, advocates' fears were, for the most part,
not realized. 68 Yet the Supreme Court allowed the fracturing of
majority-minority districts in Georgia v. Ashcroft. 69 In the 2001
redistricting cycle, Democrats in Georgia decided to "unpack" heavy
majority-minority districts to create influence districts. 70 Influence
U1ider section 2 of the Act. Id. The Court found, however, that jurisdictions could not retrogress
from zero. Id. at 336. The'Court made it clear that section 5 "prevents nothing but backsliding,
and preclearance under § 5 affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding." Id. at 335. In
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), O'Connor clarified that section 2 does not require
"maximization." Id. at 1017, 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62 GROFMAN, supra note I.
63 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
64 521 U.S. 567 (1997). After the 1990 Census, Florida adopted a redistricting plan, but the
Attorney General would not preclear it on the ground that the plan "divided politically cohesive
minority populations." Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 Id. at 574 ..
66 ld. at 582.
67 Id. .
68 Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the
Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1212 (1999) ("Many voting rights
advocates warned that these developments would result in 'the ultimate bleaching of the U.S.
Congress' and other collegial bodies." (citation omitted».
69 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
70 Id. at 487. Georgia's new redistricting plan took the "unpacking approach," which pulled
apart heavy majority-minority districts, creating new influence districts. The benchmark plan had
fifty-six districts, eleven with more than fifty percent black population (ten districts with more
than fifty percent voting-age popUlation); the 2000 census showed "[thirteen] districts had a black
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districts require minority voters to rely upon ;whites to join them in
voting for their preferred candidate in order to be successful. 71 The
opponents to influence districts argued that the fracturing of minority
districts violated section 2 of the VRA. The Court, as it had in Bossier
1,72 refused "to equate a § 2 vote dilution inquiry with the § 5
retrogression standard."73 The Court provided that states could create
what it called "safe districts," which make it "highly likely that minority
voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice"; or create
"influence districts," which allow for more districts, but it is "not quite
as likely as under the benchmark plan [] that minority voters will be
able to elect candidates of their choice."74
The Court seemed to move further away from majority-minority
districts and the preservation of electoral gains in Bartlett v.
Strickland,75 in which it concluded that section 2 did not require states
to maintain minority crossover and influence districts. 76 Here, a North
population of at least 50%, with the black voting age population exceeding 50% in [twelve] of
those districts." Jd. at 469. The new plan had thirteen majority-minority districts, thirteen other
districts where black voting age population was between thirty and fifty percent, and four
additional districts with a black voting age population of between twenty-five and thirty percent.
Jd. at 470.
[T]he new plan reduced by five the number of districts with a black voting age
popUlation in excess of 60% ... [y]et increased the number of majority-black voting
age population districts by one, and it increased the number of districts with a black
voting age popUlation of between 25% and 30% by four.
Jd. at 470-71.
71 See id. at 483 ("Section 5 leaves room for States to use these types of influence and
coalitional districts."); see also id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "coalition districts" as
those "in which minorities are in fact shown to have a similar opportunity [to elect candidates of
their choice] when joined by predictably supportive nonminority voters" (citation omitted»; Luke
C. McLoughlin, Note, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional Districts. Party Primaries and Manageable
Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 312, 314 (2005) (arguing for the use of "so-called
'coalitional districts,' where consistent support from the minority bloc, along with crossover
support from white voters, may result in electoral success despite the absence of a fifty-percent
majority").
72 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
73 Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 478 (noting that "a plan that merely preserves current minority voting
strength is entitled to § 5 preclearance," even a plan "with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive
purpose or effect does not violate § 5 ... no matter how unconstitutional it may be"). The Court
stated that "[p]reclearance under § 5 affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding." Jd. at 477.
The State argued that a plan satisfying section 2 should automatically satisfy section 5 for
preclearance. Jd. at 477-78. The Court reiterated its holding from Bossier J, where it held that a
"violation of § 2 is not an independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5." Id. at 478.
74 Jd. at 480 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court first stated that
the "power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," a statement that
leads right into the Court's discussion of influence districts. Jd. at 482 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). An "influence district" is one in which minorities "play a
substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process." Id. When looking at the effectiveness
of these types of districts, the Court considered "the likelihood that candidates elected without
decisive minority support would be willing to take the minority's interests into account." Jd.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
75 129 S. Ct 1231 (2009).
76 The Court explained:
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Carolina county argued that section 2 of the VRA required it to split
counties in order to maintain a majority-minority district that had fallen
below fifty percent minority.?7 County officials attempted to maintain
the district despite the fact that state law prohibited splitting counties
because they believed that the VRA required it to draw a district that
could sustain an opportunity for minorities to elect their candidate of
choice. 78 The Court reiterated that section 2 can require the creation of
majority-minority districts, where the Gingles preconditions are met. 79
The Court found that section 2 does not require a jurisdiction to
maintain minority districts where minorities constitute less than a
majority. 80 Moreover, it found that the reconstituted district did not
meet the first prong of Gingles,81 which requires that the minority group
be geographically compact enough to constitute a majority within the
district. The North Carolina county could not draw a district that
created a majority-minority district and as such, the Court held, it could
not argue that section 2 required that result because it could not meet the
Gingles standard. 82
The Supreme Court's idea of post-racial redistricting seems to lie
in the hopes of crossover, influence, and coalition districts. These
alternatives, however, do not offer minority voters a clear opportunity to
elect. They merely offer an opportunity to influence an outcome that is
reliant upon nonminority voters joining their preferred candidate.
Clearly, as the Court has stated, the VRA does not assure an outcome,
and minority voters are expected to make the same types of political
trades as other voters, but the history of voting in America and the
ability of lawmakers and others to manipulate the election process to
adversely affect the success of minority candidates is troubling.
Nonetheless, in order to maintain the gains that have been made under
the VRA and to encourage legislators to maintain districts that are less
than majority, voting rights advocates should, inter alia, consider using
Bartlett as a means to prevent backsliding.
The present case involves an intennediate type of District-a so-called crossover
district. Like an influence district, a crossover district is one in which minority voters
make up less than a majority of the voting-age population. But in a crossover district,
the minority population, at least potentially, is large enough to elect the candidate of its
choice with help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to
support the minority's preferred candidate.
Id. at 1242.
77 Id. at 1239.
78 In Bartlett, the State of North Carolina used the VRA as a defense to maintaining an
influence district. Id. In drafting a new state legislative plan, the State argued that section 2 of
the Act required that it maintain the district at a level where minority voters had an opportunity to
elect its candidate of choice. Id.
79 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
80 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1243-45.
81 /d. at 1241-42, 1249.
82 Id. at 1249.
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POST-RAcIAL REDISTRICTING AND THE PRESERVATION
OF MINORITY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

The VRA has endured forty-five years of various iterations and
generational waves of success. Now, the VRA can also endure the
current claims of post-racialism and the need to eliminate raceconscious remedies in many respects, including voting. Unfortunately,
we live in a country where race still matters and it certainly still matters
in voting. The race of the candidate and the demographics of the
political district can determine the winner of the election before a vote
is ever cast.
Voting rights advocates must first recognize that the post-racial era
supporters will continue the crusade to eliminate the VRA and minority
electoral gains. VRA advocates can address those concerns by
highlighting present day realities that demonstrate a need for continued
VRA protections. Accordingly, advocates must embrace various
methods, including: (1) utilizing the Supreme Court's language in
Bartlett to argue for the maintenance of crossover and influence
districts; (2) litigating and supporting cases under sections 2 and 5 of
the VRA that will prevent backsliding in majority-minority districts;
and (3) participating in the administrative process under section 5 and
providing redistricting information, such as maps and grassroots
information, that can assist the Department of Justice or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in making a
determination whether to preclear a submitted redistricting plan.
A.

Are We Post-Racial Yet?

While considerable progress has been made, we have not reached
the elimination of racial considerations in the redistricting process. The
calls for the end of racial considerations are premature and centered
upon the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the United
States as the seminal event that altered the racial paradigm in
America. 83 These assertions also fail to recognize the role that the VRA
continues to play in the elimination of electoral barriers.

83 See, e.g., Michael Crowley, Post-Racial, NEW REpUBLIC, Mar. 12, 2008, at 7; Steele,
supra note 10; see also Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Op-Ed., Taking Race Out of
the Race: White Voters' Support for Obama Suggests a Dramatic Change in the Electorate, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at M5.
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For example, the VRA is an example of race conscious legislation
adopted to address race discrimination in the area of voting. 84 The
passage of the VRA greatly impacted African Americans' ability to
register to vote and seek public office. 85 Its adoption provided a tool to
address the disparities between white and nonwhite voters. The number
of black elected officials also increased tremendously. 86 Today, more
than 10,000 minorities hold federal, state, and local offices. 87 At the
time that Congress passed and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the
VRA, less than 100 African Americans held any public office across the
country. In 2006 and 2007, there were approximately 6000 African
American, 4000 Latino, and considerably more Asian and Native
American elected officials across the country. 88 These gains can be
attributed, in large part, to the passage and implementation of the VRA
and its dismantling of racially discriminatory voting practices.
Additionally, while the VRA has certainly removed barriers,
obstacles remain to a truly post-racial election process. For example,
although President Obama's election serves as a symbol of progress, it
also demonstrates the role race continues to play in elections. We can
measure the level that race plays in elections by performing a regression
analysis. 89 This analysis can measure the level of racially polarized
voting in any jurisdiction in which there is a significant minority

84 See, e.g., Bossier 11, 52S U.S. 320, 361 (2000) ("This evil in Congress's sights was
discrimination, abridgment of the right to vote, not merely discrimination that happens to cause
retrogression, and Congress's intent to frustrate the unconstitutional evil by barring a replacement
scheme of discrimination from being put into effect was not confined to anyone subset of
discriminatory schemes.").
85 Scholars such as Professor Pamela Karlan characterize the VRA as an important step
toward solving what they call the "first-generation problem of formal disenfranchisement." See
Pamela S. Karlan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on African Americans: Second and Third
Generation Issues, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121, 122
(Mark E. Rush ed., 1995).
86 See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2000 (2002), available at http://www.jointcenter.org!
index.php/content/download/IS09/12453/fileIBEO-00.pdf; Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman,

The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Ojjiceholding in Southern
State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 335, 345 tbl.ll.l (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); Charles E. Jones, African American State Legislative Politics, 30 J.
BLACK STUD. 741, 741 (2000); see also MILDRED AMER, CONGo REs. SERV., BLACK MEMBERS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONGRESS
IS70-200S
(200S),
available
at
http://assets.opencrs.comlrptsIRL3037S_200S1204.pdf.
87 See National Database of Non-White Elected Ojjicials, GEND. & MULTI-CULTURAL
LEADERSHIP PROJECT, http://www.gmcl.org/maps/nationallfederal.htm (last visited Jan. 07,
2011).
88 Id.
89 Kristen Clarke, The Obama Factor: The Impact of the 2008 Presidential Election on
Future Voting Rights Act Litigation, 3 HARV. L. & POL'y REv. 59, 65-66 (2009) (discussing the
use of regression analysis in the 200S presidential election).
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population and minority candidates running for office. 90 As evidence
that race remains a strong consideration, one needs to look no further
than the same historical presidential election. Post-racial proponents
neglect to mention that while President Obama certainly received votes
from all races of people, he did not win any state in the Deep South,
where racially polarized voting continues to predominate. 91 The
regression analysis provides an explanation as to reasons why President
Obama was unable to capture white voters in the South, and points to
his race as the predominate factor. Nonetheless, while President
Obama's election is a clear sign of progress, the VRA continues to serve
as a centerpiece for ensuring continued steps forward toward complete
equality in the election process, particularly in the areas of redistricting
and the creation of election districts.
B.

Using the VRA's Influence

While section 2 of the VRA cannot mandate influence districts,92
the Bartlett decision can offer advocates a slight glimmer of hope for
maintaining these and other less-than-majority districts at sustainable
levels. Curiously, the Court tends to instruct jurisdictions on ways to
deconstruct majority-minority districts to create influence or crossover
districts. It reminds states that they have the discretion to create
influence districts, even where majority-minority districts are present
but not required. 93

90 See Stephen Ansolabehere et ai., Race, Region and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1395-96 (2010)
(discussing conclusions of regression analysis in elections where there is a minority candidate).
91 See Jonathan Tilove, Obama Made Inroads with White Voters Except in Deep South,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 9, 2008, at AI, available at
http://www.nola.com/news/
index.ssfl2008/l1/obama_made_inroads_with_white.html (citing the existence of raciallypolarized voting as a reason for the lack of popularity for Obama in the Deep South).
92 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1248 (2009) ("When we address the mandate of
§ 2, however, we must note it is not concerned with maximizing minority voting strength, and, as
a statutory matter, § 2 does not mandate creating or preserving crossover districts." (citing
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,1017,1022 (1994))).
93 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1238-48. The Court stated:
[Majority-minority1districts are only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if
Section 2 applies based on a totality of the circumstances .

. . . In areas with substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the plaintiffs would be
able to establish the third Gingles precondition-bloc voting by majority voters. In
those areas majority-minority districts would not be required in the first place; and in
the exercise of lawful discretion States could draw crossover districts as they deemed
appropriate.
Id. at 1238, 1248 (internal citation omitted).
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In Bartlett, the Court seems to embrace post-racial notions that
race has become less of a factor in the electoral process. 94 Under the
Supreme Court's suggested scheme, minority voters would lose
majority status in those districts without substantial support from white
voters. 95 The process of securing that support results in minorities
losing the opportunity to influence a broader set of decisions that white
voters may not support. 96 Granted, minority voters have always had the
responsibility to campaign and educate voters about the process and to
make political trade-offs.97 This scheme, however, is not a trade-off but
surrender.
The Court neglects to recognize the historical significance in the
redistricting process and moves minority voters and their intentions as
inconsequential players in a game of political football. The continued
existence of racially polarized voting makes the type of coalition voting
required improbable in many parts of the country, such that the effect is
essentially the loss of minority voting strength. 98 State, county and
94 See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REv 2208,2228 (2003) (arguing that coalitional districts may be
a solution in light of reports of a reduction in racially polarized voting in such districts).
95 Janai S. Nelson, White Challengers. Black Majorities: Reconciling Competition in
Majority-Minority Districts with the Promise of the Voting Rights Act, 95 GEO. L.J. 1287 (2007).
The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act, including its contemporary charge,
makes clear that its mission to eradicate enduring racial disparities in political power
and electoral access looms large and remains unfulfilled. Racial minorities in
majority-minority districts are left with the dilemma of forcibly uniting behind a single
candidate in order to demonstrate political cohesion and avoid fragmentation of their
vote or voting their consciences and, thereby, risking absolute defeat in the
collective .... Doctrinally, the Voting Rights Act allows minorities an opportunity to
aggregate their votes as a group and attain electoral success, but in doing so, does not
safeguard against defeat in which the non- or least-preferred candidate wins because of
vote fragmentation.
Id. at 1310-1l.
96 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (2005)
(noting that districts in which minorities must collaborate with majority voters to elect their
representatives comes at the cost ofiosing the chance to influence a wider agenda).
97 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) ("[M]inority voters are not immune from
the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground."); see also Luis FuentesRohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, The Politics of Preclearance, 12 MICH. 1. RACE & L. 513, 53435 (2007) ("The concept of a preclearance requirement presupposes a broken political market,
where political actors are unable to bargain with similarly situated participants. This is no longer
the world we live in. Unlike the political milieu that gave rise to the act [sic] in 1965, this is a
time when communities of color can do their bidding through the traditional workings of the
political process. In fact, it may be said that the recent amendment and extension of the Act offer
conclusive prooffor this proposition.").
98 See Terry Smith, Disappearing Districts: Minority Vote Dilution Doctrine as Politics, 93
MINN L. REV. 1680, 1691, 1695 (2009) (arguing that the purpose of section 2 is to "provide
protection for racial and language minorities who are effectively locked out from this system
because racially polarized voting prevents the formation of electoral coalitions"; however, the
decision in Bartlett effectively "impos[ed] additional hurdles to the formation of multi-racial
electoral coalitions," mainly, the requirement that in a section 2 challenge, a plaintiff must show
the minority group in question constitutes a voting age majority).
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local officials have extremely important decisions to make regarding the
configuration of voting districts and their demographic consistencies.
Any decision to maintain current levels of influence and crossover
districts, especially those where the difficult balance of black and white
support allows for the election of minority-preferred candidates, should
be maintained under the Supreme Court's logic that these districts help
eliminate the significance of racial disparities. Indeed, the Court
provided instructions on ways to "unpack" districts with "substantial
minority population," which allow majority-minority districts to create
influence districts. 99
"Substantial minority population" seems to
suggest that the Court would carve out an exception for supermajority
districts, those districts that include minority populations in excess of
sixty-five percent, to ensure an opportunity to elect. loo This suggestion
is troubling in that it encourages legislatures to unpack or crack those
minority districts that may have successfully elected a minority
candidate of choice.
In Bartlett, Justice Souter suggested that
jurisdictions demonstrate that minorities would have "effective
influence" before "shifting" from majority-minority to influence
districts. 101
In consideration of the Court's language, advocates should
embrace the preservation of existing crossover and influence districts,
particularly where a majority-minority district is unavailable. In those
instances, advocates should argue that the dismantling of existing
crossover districts runs afoul of the Supreme Court's idea of creating a
race neutral environment. Accordingly, their continued maintenance is
required and efforts to dissolve their configurations contravene Supreme
Court jurisprudence.

99 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1248 (2009) ("Assuming a majority-minority
district with a substantial minority population, a legislative determination, based on proper
factors, to create two crossover districts may serve to diminish the significance and influence of
race by encouraging minority and majority voters to work together toward a common goal.").
100 Bullock & Dunn, supra note 68, at 1214 (citing the "sixty-five percent rule," as the
percentage of African American voters traditionally needed to maintain an equal opportunity to
participate).
10 1 Justice Souter writes:
Before a State shifts from majority-minOrity to coalition districts ... [it] bears the
burden of proving ... not merely that minOrity voters in new districts may have some
influence, but that minority voters will have effective influence translatable into
probable election results comparable to what they enjoyed under the existing district
scheme. And to demonstrate this, a State ... must show that the probable voting
behavior of [white] voters will make coalitions with minorities a real prospect. If the
State's evidence fails to [do so,] a reduction in supermajority districts must be treated
as ... fatally retrogressive ....
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498,2518 (2003) (Souter, 1., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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DOJ's Influence

The Supreme Court has questioned the viability of the VRA,
particularly, section 5.102 And its recent section 2 case, Bartlett, has
weakened the Act. 103 Moreover, the Department of Justice's role in the
section 5 process and its interpretation of Georgia v. Ashcroft, Bartlett,
and Congress's amendment to the 2006 VRA reauthorization could
mean the difference between maintenance of gains and retrogression. 104
The choices of the state legislators make it even more important
that the Department of Justice enforce the VRA and adhere to its
purpose "to protect the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred
candidates of choice."105 The 2011 redistricting serves as the first
where a Democratic administration will review the section 5
submissions after a decennial census since the passage of the VRA. All
other post-decennial redistricting had Republican administrations at the
helm of the Department of Justice. 106 Accordingly, this Department of
Justice will also serve as the first to review. redistricting plans under
Congress's Georgia v. Ashcroft fix, which would allow it to object to
redistricting plans that discriminate in purpose or effect and that
diminish the minority population's ability to elect its candidate of
choice. 107
102 In NAMUDNO, the Supreme Court, while not ruling on the issue, called section 5's
constitutionality into question. NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 ("Our usual
practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional question ... We therefore ... do
not reach the constitutionality of § 5."); see also Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act
Through the Justices' Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1,4 (2009).
103 The Court discussed the different applications of sections 2 and 5 in Bartlett. See Bartlett,
129 S. Ct. at 1249 ("The inquiries under §§ 2 and 5 are different. Section 2 concerns minority
groups' opportunity 'to elect representatives of their choice,' while the more stringent § 5 asks
whether a change has the purpose or effect of 'denying or abridging the right to vote.' In LULAC,
we held that although the presence of influence districts is relevant for the § 5 retrogression
analysis, 'the lack of such districts cannot establish a § 2 violation.'" (citing 42 U.S.c. §§
1973(b), 1973c (2006); League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,
446 (2006))).
104 Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 97, at 534-35.
105 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(d).
106 Previous administrations have been criticized for involvement in previous redistricting
cycles. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995) ("Instead of grounding its
objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would appear the Government was driven
by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts."); Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft: It's
the End of Section 5 as We Know It (And I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REv. 265, 276-77 (2005)
(describing the Department of Justice's zealous involvement in the redistricting process).
107 See Benjamin E. Griffith, Reinforcing the Formidable Arsenal: Restoration of Purposefol
Discrimination as a Basis for Denial of Section 5 Preclearance Under the Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments of 2006,
29 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L. REV. 705, 724 (2007) ("Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is now a
more potent weapon than ever before as part of the federal government's 'formidable arsenal' in
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How the current Department of Justice will interpret the 2006
reauthorization and the Supreme Court's recent cases will determine
whether covered jurisdictions will maintain the minority gains that have
been made during the 2011 round of redistricting. 108
During the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA,109 Congress included
a legislative fix to the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft
that allowed states to "unpack" majority-minority districts and create
influence districtS. IIO This "fix" in the 2006 reauthorization may serve
as the only answer to preempt attempts to diminish majority-minority
districts. The fix, however, only applies to section 5 jurisdictions.
Essentially, only those jurisdictions that are covered under section 5 will
be reviewed to determine whether the redistricting plan diminishes the
minority population's ability to elect its preferred candidate.
Effectively, in section 5 states that currently have majority-minority
districts, the Ashcroft fix would prohibit states from unpacking
majority-minority districts to create influence districts.
While voters in covered jurisdictions may rely on section 5 to
preempt diminished electoral opportunity, jurisdictions that are not
covered must rely on section 2's nationwide prohibition against
purposeful discrimination. Under section 2, minority voters could bring
actions against the legislature where it decreases the majority-minority
district to create more influence districts, which can serve as a
gargantuan task considering the costs and length of section 2 litigation.
Accordingly, the Department of Justice's interpretation and
enforcement of the protections within section 5 of the Act can serve as a
valuable nonpartisan tool in enforcing the VRA.

the ongoing fight against voting discrimination. It reaches not only retrogressive voting changes
sought to be implemented in covered jurisdictions, but it also now extends to voting changes that
have been developed for a discriminatory purpose, even in the absence of retrogression. ").
108 See, e.g., Themstrom, supra note 9, at 75, 77 (arguing that the DOl is ill-prepared to
"resolve complicated questions involving race and representation," especially in the short time
required by law, and that majority-minority districts "that DOl forces ... act as a brake on racial
change on the greater integration of black voters ... into American mainstream politics").
109 In 2006, Congress reauthorized the temporary provisions of the VRA in the Fannie Lou
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments
Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
110 See 42 U .S.C. § 1973c(b), which states:
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title [42 U.S.c. §
1973b(f)(2)], to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to
vote within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section.
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CONCLUSION
Have we reached the post-racial promised land? Not yet.
However, we are closer than we were forty-five years ago when the
VRA was passed. 111 Should we consider race in the election process?
If those considerations lead us to an electoral process that allows all
citizens to participate equally in the political process, then absolutely.
The 1965 VRA has maintained equality as its aim and primary
purpose.II 2 Its continued existence is crucial to ensuring equal access at
the polls. Some have questioned the use of race in the redistricting
process. I13 While Bartlett causes some concern, advocates are not
without hope. Proponents have tools in their arsenal to combat
backsliding in the redistricting process. Protections under the VRA
provide the best measures to maintain current levels of minority
electoral success. Clearly, the VRA remains a central tool to protect
previous electoral gains.

III Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
112 Lisa Erickson, The Impact o/the Supreme Court's Criticism o/the Justice Department in
Miller v. Johnson, 65 MISS. L.J. 409, 410 (1995) (stating that one of the purposes of the VRA was
to further the Fifteenth Amendment).
113 E.g., Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Op-Ed., Racial Gerrymandering Is
Unnecessary,
WALL
ST. 1., Nov. 11, 2008, at A15, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122637373937516543 .htrnl.

